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Introduction
by Jason Adair
For a man who experienced many battles, 26 October 1917 was a pivotal day for 
Lieutenant Tom Rutherford. Destined to have 
a long and distinguished career, his experience 
that day, in many ways, would shape his 
military character and strengthen his resolve 
in defeating the German enemy.
Lieutenant Tom Rutherford, from Owen 
Sound, Ontario, was a platoon commander in 
“D” Company of the 4th Battalion, Canadian 
Mounted Rifles. Rutherford joined the 31st 
Grey Regiment in 1912, was a member of the 
147th Grey Battalion and later the 8th Reserve 
Battalion, joining the 4th CMR in April 1917. 
The year 1917 brought a series of successes 
for the Canadian Corps beginning with Vimy 
Ridge in April and ending with Hill 70 in 
August. In general, these victories seemed to 
be the product of unprecedented planning and 
preparation that would become the hallmark 
of Canadian operations during the war. Using 
careful staff planning as the template for 
success, the Canadians prepared for the attack 
on Passchendaele. From the beginning of the 
planning process, it was evident that this proven 
template of meticulous preparation would be 
difficult to apply. General Currie was concerned 
about the condition of the battlefield, which had 
seen the wettest summer in 30 years and three 
years of continuous shellfire. This had greatly 
altered the water table causing a morass of 
mud. In fact, nearly half of the battlefield was 
covered in water.1  These conditions created 
problems in attack preparations including the 
inability to access ample artillery support and 
the sheer difficulty of moving other needed 
supplies to forward areas. Furthermore, 
German defenders had increased the depth of 
their defences trading the trench for the pillbox 
and also used a series of positions in forward 
areas designed to break up attacks before 
assaulting forces could overwhelm the main 
defensive area.2  Despite these conditions and 
their resultant problems the Canadian Corps 
was poised for attack. 
The Canadian Corps attacks in the late 
fall of 1917 toward the Belgian village of 
Passchendaele represented the last phase of 
the British attempt to break out of the Ypres 
Salient and seize the German-held channel 
ports. The overall offensive commenced 31 
July 1917 and included British, French, New 
Zealand, Australian and Canadian troops. It 
was marred by unachievable objectives and 
deplorable terrain conditions.3 
Until October 1917, the Canadian role in the 
offensive was limited but as the British faltered 
the Canadian Corps was reassigned to the 
British 2nd Army and given the task of capturing 
the village of Passchendaele. Lieutenant-
General Arthur Currie was not impressed at 
the prospect of committing his Corps to an 
offensive that had lost its momentum and 
seemed of little value to the improvement of the 
strategic situation.4  Nevertheless, as early as 
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Opposite: A lone Canadian soldier walks across the 
desolation of the Passchendaele battlefield, November 
1917.
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13 October preparations began for an operation 
that sought to give indirect assistance to the 
pending French attack in Champagne, to keep 
the enemy occupied during preparations for 
the planned attack at Cambrai, and to adopt a 
suitable defensive posture for the winter atop 
the 165-foot high Passchendaele ridge.5 
The Canadian Corps attacked at 0540 hours on 
26 October. The assault was preceded by four 
days of artillery bombardment. The Canadians 
attacked along a two-division front divided 
by the Ravebeek swamp. The 3rd Canadian 
Division was on the left with the 8th Brigade 
deploying a single battalion, the 4th Canadian 
Mounted Rifles (4th CMR), and the 9th Brigade 
deploying two battalions, the 43rd and the 58th. 
The 4th Canadian Division was on the right and 
was more constrained in terms of frontage. This 
meant it could only use one battalion, the 46th, 
in the initial assault. Although the Canadian 
Corps did not succeed in achieving all of its 
objectives, the British High Command were 
pleased and determined that the Canadian 
gains would enhance the effectiveness of 
future attacks. The Canadians suffered 2,481 
casualties between 26 and 28 October. With only 
seven battalions of six hundred men involved in 
the attack, the casualties were extremely high.6  
One of the seven battalions attacking on 26 
October was the 4th CMR, from Central Ontario. 
It was on the extreme left of the Canadian 
Corps front and was given the unenviable task 
of attacking through a bog to the intermediate 
objective of Wolf Copse and on to the final 
objective of the Woodland Plantation, a distance 
of 600 metres along a two company frontage 
(“C” Company left, “B” Company right). October 
26th was described as the “bloodiest day in the 
battalion’s history” but one that would also see 
a young soldier inspire his battalion through a 
single-handed assault on a German pillbox. For 
this courageous act, Private Tom Holmes, from 
Owen Sound, was awarded the Victoria Cross. 
What follows is Rutherford’s recollection of the 
Battle of Passchendaele. Written in the late 
1920s, this account provides detailed insights 
into the battle through the eyes of a young 
officer and highlights the challenges facing the 
Canadian infantryman at Passchendaele.
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Just my own personal experience and observations. No one saw the whole Battle 
and most records written by those who were 
not there have distorted it in many ways. For 
instance, few who have read accounts of the Battle 
would believe that there were only two pillboxes 
each on the 4th CMR front and on that of the 
43rd Battalion. There was, however, a machine-
gun post in a trench on our left Company front. 
I can vouch for this as I was back and went over 
the ground carefully twice, once about eight days 
after the Battle and once in February 1918 just 
before we left for home. Quite a few of the men 
in the left sector Companies went forward of the 
objective and, finding nothing, came back and 
dug in on the objective; in doing so they had to 
take out a machine-gun position opposite and 
to the left of the pillbox close to the centre of 
our Battalion front. I, for instance, saw nothing 
of the recorded incident of the truce to pick up 
wounded.
After the Hill 70 offensive north of Lens in July 
and August 1917, the Canadian Corps was pulled 
out of the front line into the back areas to practice 
going over the tapes, as was done before Vimy, 
for an Offensive that was to take place on the 
Merrycourt front south of Lens to complement 
the successful Hill 70 show to the north, and 
thus leave the important coal mines and city in 
a salient that could be pinched off later. All of a 
sudden, after we had practised for a couple of 
weeks, plans were changed and the entire Corps 
was moved north into billets in the flat open 
country around Poperinge, west of Ypres. 
On our arrival here we learned that we were 
shortly to go in to relieve the Anzacs (the name 
given to the Australian-New Zealand Corps) who, 
with the British, had been struggling to expand the 
Ypres salient farther to the east. I well remember 
the day our Company Commander, Captain Bill 
Muirhead, and the other Company Commanders 
were taken up to look over the place where the 
Regiment was to attack and what he told us, when 
he came back, of the conditions we would be up 
against. He was a good and brave Officer, but was 
far from pleased with the prospect of taking his 
Company into the morass he had seen which was 
protected by several German concrete pillboxes 
instead of underground dugouts such as we had 
been accustomed to seeing farther south in the 
chalk soils of Vimy and Hill 70. 
The day that we were to leave soon arrived. We 
took a train as far as Ypres, where we detrained 
and marched through the battered, uninhabited 
city with its one-time beautiful Cathedral and 
Cloth Hall. The Germans, probably seeing our 
movement from the air, were shelling the city 
with naval guns which had a very long range. 
However, we had no casualties that I remember. 
Just at dusk we arrived in the St. Jean area. 
Some, I recall, went into a tunnel but most of the 
Battalion were in tents which kept us out the rain 
but were no protection when the German planes 
came over at night and pulled their tailboards, 
showering the area with pineapple bombs. 
On October 23 we moved forward to a bit of 
Lieutenant 
Rutherford’s 
account
Lieutenant Tom Rutherford, photographed in early 1916, 
wearing the insignia of the 147th Grey Battalion. This 
battalion was broken up to reinforce battalions already 
in France.
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higher ground called Abraham Heights where 
we spent the night in such dry shell-holes as we 
could find; late the next day, the 24th, we moved 
forward to the position from which we were to 
attack on the 26th. As we were leaving Abraham 
Heights to go up to our jumping-off trench we 
lost two Officers, Lieutenant Jack Campbell and 
Captain Johnny Woods, both killed with the same 
shell. They were both outstanding Officers whom 
the Battalion could ill afford to lose. Because what 
little there was in the way of a track was being 
shelled, we were well spread out; some Platoons 
got lost and didn’t get in until late the following 
morning. 
The trench we occupied was hardly worthy of 
the name – just a broken down ditch with up to 
six inches of water in parts of it. However, on the 
25th the sun came out and it was a reasonably 
warm day. We were able to dry our wet clothes, 
and those of us who were to lead the operations 
at the 0540 zero hour the next morning had 
a chance to get our Orders and look over the 
ground in front of us which we were to cross 
next morning. We were each given a small sketch-
map of our own area which had little on it except 
our position, our objective, and the boundaries 
between the 4th CMR and the Battalions on our 
right and left, together with the inter-Company 
boundary. The 4th CMR were on the left of the 
Corps, with, I think, the Artist Rifles of the British 
Naval Division on our left, and the 43rd Canadian 
Infantry Battalion on our right. 
The Battalion front was only a little over a quarter-
of-a-mile wide and little more from our jumping-
off trench to our objective, and practically level 
but rising slightly towards our objective. It was 
divided down the centre into two Company fronts; 
on the right “D” Company with “A” Company in 
support, and on the left “C” Company was in 
front with “B” Company in support. One Platoon 
of each of the front Companies was to patrol 
the front up to the barrage line from 12 o’clock 
until just before zero hour, by which time they 
were to be well forward close to the barrage line 
in packets of sections. My Platoon had this job 
on the right Company front, and Jaffray Eaton’s 
Platoon from “C” Company had the same job on 
the left. 
During the afternoon of the 25th the weather was 
clear and sunny, and I spent a lot of time going 
from one end of our Company front to the other 
with a pair of binoculars in an effort to familiarize 
myself with the ground ahead. The right flank 
Lieutenant Tom Rutherford (standing on right) poses for a photograph with a group of 4 CMR officers from Owen Sound.
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of our Company was in a little wood relatively 
much smaller than the Wolf Copse as it is called 
on the sketch-map in the 4th CMR History. It was 
elm trees about a foot through and, at that time 
of year, bare of leaves. In the centre of this wood 
and on the enemy side stood the ruins of a small 
house, just one wall about three or four feet high. 
It was called “Wolf Farm.” Beyond Wolf Farm and 
on the edge of the wood was what appeared to 
be an enemy pillbox covered on top and in front 
with broken bricks, apparently from Wolf Farm 
as the loose bricks had been gathered up around 
that area. Beyond this and about 300 yards to 
the right (well over on the 43rd Battalion front) 
and on the end of a small spur that dominated 
the whole area, was another very obvious pillbox. 
Farther back but still well over on the 43rd 
front and about in line with our given objective, 
was what appeared to be another pillbox, also 
covered in front and on top with what appeared 
to be broken bricks. Beyond that, the ground 
apparently fell away somewhat as I could not see 
it except over on the right where it was higher. 
However, I could see the tops of the trees in what 
was marked on our sketch-map as “Woodland 
Plantation.” 
On the left of the Company front there was 
a row of trees about 50 yards in front of our 
position, planted along what apparently had 
been a farm road going from Wollemolen over to 
Wolf Farm; the ground here was very low, with 
large shell-holes full of water with some areas 
completely flooded. Right on our boundary with 
“C” Company and about 200 yards from our 
trench was another pillbox on somewhat higher 
ground than where I was standing. On this flank 
I met my long-time friend who had just joined 
the Battalion – Jaffray Eaton (the only son of 
a widowed mother) who had been Second-in-
Command of our Grey County Battalion and 
had reverted from Major to get to France. His 
task on the left forward Company front was the 
same as mine on the right; that is to say, to patrol 
the Company front after midnight to make sure 
that no enemy was lurking close by and then to 
deploy his sections close to the barrage line just 
before zero hour. 
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From where we stood we could see his Company 
front and although we could not detect any 
pillboxes we definitely suspected that some were 
there. So we agreed that I would come to the left 
flank with one of my sections and endeavour to 
get to the pillbox that appeared to be about on 
the line which divided the Company fronts, as 
there seemed to be less water on my side than 
on his although both were badly flooded. We 
agreed to meet on that flank just before zero 
hour to exchange any further information we 
had gathered. 
I then went back to the centre of our Company 
front and gave Captain Muirhead the information 
I had. Lieutenant Arthur Deacon and Lieutenant 
“Dinty” Moore were with him. The Headquarters 
was a projection cut in the side of the trench and 
covered with some old boards, the ceiling was 
only about four feet high. The sun was shining 
and it was a chance to get dry (except for wet 
feet) so I went out and stood with my back to 
the side of the trench and talked for a couple 
of hours to one of my men – Robson by name – 
who happened to be from Owen Sound. There 
had been no shelling all morning but all at once 
a Wooly Bear burst in the air in a direct line 
with where we were standing, making the typical 
little cloud of black smoke. Within half-a-minute 
there was another one right over our heads, and 
a piece of shrapnel went in behind Robson’s gas 
respirator and his chest and grazed his ribs. He 
bled rather badly and also coughed up blood, but 
a volunteer stretcher party soon had him on the 
way to “Crown Prince’s Farm,” which was a large 
pillbox that served as Battalion Headquarters and 
a Dressing Station. These were the only shells 
that day. I guess the Germans were also enjoying 
the bright sunshine. 
Then night closed in and with a couple of hunks 
of bread in my stomach but no water, I lay 
down and slept, to be wakened at midnight to 
do my patrol of the area in front of the trench, 
accompanied by two of my own men. We spent 
most of the time at Wolf Farm as we could stand 
on the floor and look out over the low wall which 
still stood. Funnily enough, I was told after the 
battle that when the Company went past in the 
morning two German soldiers came out of the 
cellar; one shot at Lieutenant Moore, wounding 
him in the head. They must have been lying low 
in there while we stood on the floor above them. 
The rest of my Platoon had been assigned to their 
A panorama of the Passchendaele battlefield as it appeared in November 1917,
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forward positions the afternoon before and would 
take them up just before zero hour so that they 
might move close under the barrage. 
About half an hour before zero hour I returned 
with my patrol to Company Headquarters to get 
another hunk of bread and to fill our water bottles 
as we expected the water would have arrived 
by then. But no water had come. The Battalion 
went over without any – “Water, water everywhere 
but not a drop to drink.” Having been crawling 
around in unspeakable filth for much of the past 
four hours, when handed a loaf of bread I reached 
forward and wrenched a piece off with my teeth so 
as not to foul the rest of it. Right there I was read 
a lecture on manners – and a serious one, too – by 
Lieutenant Arthur Deacon, a Bank Manager from 
Stratford and 20 years older than I. I resented 
it at the time because had he known what I had 
been crawling over during the night, I think he 
would have realized that my approach was the 
more sanitary. However, before many hours had 
passed I was to find out that underneath his 
formal manner lay the heart of one of the bravest 
men I have ever known. 
About 0500 hours I went back with a section of 
four men to the left of the Company front where I 
had arranged to meet Jaffray Eaton. It was almost 
time to move out into our forward positions so, 
having confirmed what we had decided the day 
before, we shook hands and each, with our little 
sections of four men, went his separate way. We 
were no sooner there than a flash of light in the 
semi-darkness behind told us that our shells 
were coming, so we laid low in shell-holes lest 
any fall short. The first rounds came in almost a 
straight line right in front of us, but the second 
rounds were not so good and many fell short as 
the guns had very little platform in the mud a 
mile behind. I think probably it was one of these 
that got Jaffray Eaton as I found his bones when 
I visited Passchendaele 16 months later before we 
left Belgium to come home to Canada. Someone 
had apparently covered him up with earth where 
he fell and put up a little picket cross about a 
foot high, but the rains had washed his skull 
clean and while I could find no identity disk I 
knew it was Jaffray by his teeth which were quite 
distinctive. I believe there were many more killed 
the same way that morning. 
When the barrage lifted we went forward in a 
drizzle of rain, and in the grey dawn of a Flanders 
morning we were soon up to our knees in water 
and tangled in wire which was underneath the 
water and fastened to the row of trees I mentioned 
earlier. Apparently Captain Muirhead could see 
me from the trench and sent a messenger to tell 
me I must get on. By this time I had disentangled Photo by William
Rider-Rider,
NAC PA 40139
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myself from the wire but hadn’t gotten through it 
and backed up, looking for a better place to get 
ahead. I spied a tree which a shell had hit about 
four feet from the ground; it had fallen towards 
us, still clinging to the stump with bent slivers. 
I had by now lost three of my four men; only my 
runner, Tommy Brooks, was with me. I climbed 
onto the sloping tree trunk and ran up it. Looking 
down I saw nothing but water. Judging that it 
wouldn’t be too deep I jumped and, of course, 
fell and was completely under water as it was, I 
would say, almost three feet deep. I got up and 
struggled towards the other side, hearing Tommy 
land in the water behind me. 
With all my equipment and probably 50 pounds 
of water soaked into my clothing, haversack 
and gas respirator, I was unable to climb out. 
Under my tunic I was wearing a heavy khaki 
sweater that I bought in Owen Sound before I 
left home, so while still in the water I transferred 
my Mills bomb from my right jacket-pocket to 
the right pocket of my sweater and my revolver 
ammunition to my left sweater-pocket, took my 
revolver out of its holster which was attached 
to the equipment but also to a lanyard around 
my neck, unbuckled my equipment belt and 
unbuttoned my tunic. I then let the whole lot – 
map case, respirator, wire cutters, entrenching 
tool and all – slide back into the water. So with 
my revolver in my hand and the bomb in my 
sweater-pocket I was able to crawl out, soaking 
wet. I looked back to give Tommy Brooks a hand, 
but all I could see was his fair hair floating in 
bloody water. I headed for the pillbox ahead, 
catching up to a Sergeant from “C” Company who 
was heading for the same place. 
The barrage had just lifted. We saw no Germans 
around nor were we shot at. It was one of those 
pillboxes with a shallow trench close behind it 
running out to both left and right, with a wooden 
lean-to covering the trench to keep out the rain. 
The Sergeant – Sergeant Nicholas of “C” Company 
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– had his bomb ready in his hand and I motioned 
to him to go in first. We both jumped into the 
shallow trench and underneath the board cover 
until we came to the opening, where he threw 
the bomb in. Almost instantly, and before the 
bomb had gone off, a big wild-eyed German 
without weapons jumped out between us and, 
in his fright, turned on me under the low roof; 
he grabbed me by the head and started twisting 
it. I had my revolver in his chest but he didn’t 
let go and I was beginning to black out. Having 
seen other Germans coming out and following 
Nicholas out the other side I pulled on him and 
in falling on top of me, he pushed me back to 
the opening. So here was a sweater-clad figure 
backing out from the lean-to to the pillbox, with 
a dead German partly on top of him. Just then 
an excited man arriving with some others from 
“C” Company, was loading his rifle so he brought 
the butt down on my head, but as the German 
had pushed the rim of my steel hat up on edge I 
was none the worse. 
We were now up even with the other pillbox on 
our front which was, I would say, 300 yards to 
our right. Brandishing my revolver and pointing 
to it I yelled, “Come on,” and started towards 
it, never looking back. In travelling so light and 
being able to run on the drier ground turned up 
by our barrage, I made good time. When I arrived 
at, say, 50 feet from the pillbox, I saw that it had 
already been taken. Our men were not only in it 
but also huddled around the back and side of it, 
with a number apparently dead or wounded lying 
behind and at the side of it. Looking beyond it 
towards the 43rd front I could see the pillbox on 
Bellevue Spur, with Germans standing up behind 
it and firing with rifles at the 43rd – who were 
Kilties – as they tried to stumble forward through 
the mud. It was a terrible slaughter and I would 
say that almost every shot got its man. When there 
weren’t enough Highlanders in sight – some going 
forward and some running back – the Germans 
turned their rifles (I don’t remember a machine 
gun firing) on our men around the captured 
pillbox which I later learned had been taken by 
Tommy Holmes, VC. 
I saw my Company Commander and some of 
my own Platoon and decided that as long as 
there were enough of the 43rd in sight to keep 
the Gemans busy, a few men could get up past 
them to the pillbox behind, which was still under 
our barrage, and so get at the men behind the 
big pillbox on the spur from the rear. Although 
neither pillbox was on our front, it looked like 
the only way for others to get forward and there 
was no time to lose as the barrage, which seemed 
to be keeping the Germans in the pillbox, would 
soon be lifting. Archie Smith, one of my own 
Platoon, was at my side and, waving my revolver, 
I pointed towards the pillbox beyond and to the 
left of the one that was doing all the killing, and 
yelled, “Come on.” 
As we had to pass within 150 yards of the 
pillbox on the spur, Archie and I never stopped 
running because our only chance was to get by it 
unnoticed and get to the other one just as soon as 
the barrage lifted. I had no sensation of being shot 
at directly up to this time and it is not difficult 
to tell when you have a bullet pass close to your 
ear. Since leaving the water-hole and our first 
pillbox I had been able to keep on my feet and to 
keep running, only stopping this once to size up 
the situation and make up my mind as to what 
I must do. Just as Archie and I got to about 50 
Private T.W. Holmes of the 4th Battalion, Canadian 
Mounted Rifles, was awarded a Victoria Cross for his role 
in knocking out a German pill box on 26 October 1917.
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feet from the pillbox we were after, Archie spurted 
forward and, dropping on his knee, raised his 
rifle, pointing it at the corner of the pillbox but 
before he could shoot, his rifle fell from his hand 
and he slumped to the ground. I looked up but 
could see no one. 
In case someone was waiting around the corner, 
I fired two shots which ricocheted off the corner 
to scare whoever had fired. When I rounded the 
corner no one was there (he must have been about 
50 feet farther on in the sunken road which was 
our final objective for the day) so I reached for 
the bomb in my sweater-pocket. With my right 
hand having transferred my revolver to my left, 
I had made the mistake of not straightening the 
pin. It took some little time to straighten it, during 
which time I could have been shot, and, in the 
meantime, someone appeared beside me in a 
trench coat. Without looking up I handed him 
my revolver still on its lanyard around my neck, 
pulled the pin and threw the bomb in. Then I said, 
“Is that thing ever going off” – four seconds is a 
long time under such circumstances. I reached 
for my revolver and just as the man handed it 
back he was shot through the lower forearm. It 
was Lieutenant Arthur Deacon (the one who had 
read me the lecture on etiquette before dawn 
that morning). Why the same German hadn’t got 
me when I hesitated to draw the pin, I will never 
know. He was very close, but I couldn’t see him. 
Then, the Germans – 16 of them (one wounded 
and one dead were left inside) – came tumbling 
out with their hands up. Something, probably one 
of our shells because the barrage had just passed, 
hit the top of the pillbox and sent a shower of 
bricks in all directions. I told Deacon, who was 
bleeding badly and had the bone sticking out of 
his arm, to take the prisoners “already running in 
that direction with their hands up” back because 
I had another job to do. He started out behind 
them. 
Then I started out to the left to see if I could find 
some men for a covering party, and to get another 
bomb and a rifle to try to take the big pillbox on 
the 43rd front from behind. In doing this I was 
shot at twice, probably by the same man who 
got Archie Smith and Deacon, so I dropped to 
the ground and from then on I rolled from shell-
hole to shell-hole towards a Canadian steel hat 
I could see sticking out of a shell-hole. It was a 
Corporal whom I did not recognize but told him 
Two Canadian soldiers stand on a captured German pillbox near Passchendaele, November 1917. It is likely this 
pillbox is in the 4th Canadian Division sector on the right flank due to the railroad tracks in the background.
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to see if he could find some more men and meet 
me behind the pillbox I had just taken, but I never 
saw him again. I then discarded my own steel hat 
as I realized it was a give-away when hiding in 
a shell-hole; of course my face – like the rest of 
me – was plastered with mud. 
Still rolling, I started back to a position behind 
the pillbox to await the men who never came. 
On the way I found my Company Commander 
just dying in a shell-hole; he smiled at me and 
was gone. He had a bird-cage with two carrier 
pigeons. The next man I was to find was Deacon 
who, instead of going back with the prisoners, 
had stopped off, almost immediately after I had 
sent him back, with one of his men who was 
hiding in a shell-hole. The man shortly afterwards 
had been shot through the head and was lying 
across Deacon whose good arm was down in the 
mud and the wounded arm on his chest. I rolled 
the man’s body off him and up on the top of the 
shell-hole behind me to act as a background and 
got his bomb, put it in my pocket, and took his 
rifle – the muzzle of which was jammed full of 
earth. Thinking quickly, I took a round from the 
chamber, put it in the muzzle and wiggled the 
bullet loose and took it out, and put in a little mud 
to hold the cordite, then fired the round which 
cleared but did not burst the barrel, which often 
happens when a loaded round is fired through 
a plugged barrel. 
No one had arrived to form a covering party to 
help me get up to the big pillbox from the rear, 
so I stayed where I was. I could see the Germans 
standing up on something and firing at the 
Highlanders, most of whom by now had started 
to move back from shell-hole to shell-hole, but 
very few who exposed themselves were not shot 
down. My first shot was at the man on the end of 
the pillbox next to me and, although only about 
150 yards away, I missed him and he just turned 
around and looked. It was a cold rainy morning 
and by this the I had been soaking wet for at least 
20 minutes and was still lying in water. I was 
shaking like a leaf with cold and the excitement 
of the battle, and was lying across Deacon. So I 
made a little bed in the mud for my rifle to hold 
it steady, and this time I brought the German 
down, followed by his three mates near the other 
end. No one came out to take their places and as 
I could see about six inches of the entrance to the 
pillbox above the intervening ground I kept on 
firing, hoping even if I didn’t get anyone inside, 
at least to keep them inside until someone came 
up from the front. 
Soldiers from the 16th Canadian Machine Gun Company holding the line in shell holes during the Battle of Passchendaele.
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Shortly afterwards, Lieutenant Ray Warren and 
four or five “A” Company men ran past towards 
the pillbox we had taken; I called to them to come 
and get Deacon but they went on in. However, it 
wasn’t long until Warren and another man came 
out and, by my shoving and their pulling, we got 
Deacon on his feet. They went back in where it 
was warm and where German food and water 
were available. Quite some time afterwards I saw 
men coming up who wore khaki trousers instead 
of kilts like the 43rd; soon more and more came 
up and went into the pillbox. At the time I did not 
know who they were, but they were a Company 
of the 52nd Battalion who were in support to the 
43rd and who, when the firing that had killed 
about half of the attacking force had stopped, 
were able to approach and take the pillbox on the 
spur which had been responsible, I would say, for 
more than half of the men killed that day, both 
in the 43rd and in our own Battalion on the left 
of it. One man who is a good shot, armed with a 
rifle and behind a concrete block in a situation 
such as existed that day, is good for about two 
men per minute so long as they are standing up 
and exposed. 
As soon as I was satisfied that the pillbox had 
indeed fallen and that Canadians were now 
in it, I got up and went into the pillbox with 
Warren, Deacon and the others. It was a grand 
and glorious feeling, even if my clothing and feet 
were still soaking wet from my “morning bath” 
and later lying in water for most of the morning. 
I found that my bomb had killed one man in the 
pillbox and badly wounded another. He received 
the best of treatment from our men. There was 
plenty of food and water, neither of which I had 
seen very much of for 48 hours. 
One of the men who came into the last pillbox 
and whom I had to leave there, was Company 
Sergeant-Major Dunlop with whom I had slept 
in a shell-hole on “Abraham Heights” two nights 
earlier, lying as close as we could to keep warm. 
He had been shot in the stomach and thinking 
that officers carried morphine, pleaded with me 
to give him some. I never saw anyone suffer as 
he did. The stretcher-bearers got him out but 
not until after dark. Like so many others who 
were wounded he died the next day. He was a 
fine soldier. 
Some time afterwards an officer and a group of 
men from the 52nd joined us in the pillbox, and 
Warren hastily scribbled a note saying that we 
had made contact with the 52nd on the objective, 
and sent it to Headquarters. However, he didn’t 
introduce the no-rank-badges, sweater-clad 
drowned rat huddled in a corner to keep warm, 
as the man who had taken 16 prisoners out of 
that pillbox on their front, and who had remained 
outside, stopping the fire from around and over 
the key pillbox – for the taking of which no less 
than three Victoria Crosses were granted, two 
to the 43rd and one to the 52nd, and no doubt 
well earned. 
My satisfaction came when General Lipsett said 
of our Regiment, “At Passchendaele you made 
the hole through which the gallant 52nd was 
able to pass and capture Bellevue Spur.” After 
Passchendaele I recommended Arthur Deacon 
for the Military Cross, and Sergeant Nicholas for 
the Distinguished Conduct Medal. I was sent on 
a course where I was, I guess, supposed to learn 
how to look after my equipment and clothing in 
battle. Had I looked like an Officer or been laden 
down with equipment and gone where I did, I 
wouldn’t be here to tell this story. It was fighting 
like a guerrilla that saved my life. I wasn’t drunk 
– as the Colonel was told and, I am sure, believed. 
I guess I was just crazy. I went in with a three-
ounce aluminum flask of rum in the hip pocket 
of my trousers and, in spite of the cold which was 
intense, in completely saturated clothes, forgot 
it was there until I found it the next day when I 
lay on it. 
Well, we weren’t in the pillbox very long after the 
52nd boys arrived to take over when, looking 
through the door, I saw small groups of Germans 
coming down the slope on our right. This looked 
like preparation for a counterattack so I gathered 
our men together, leaving Warren with the 52nd, 
gathered up a bunch of German entrenching tools 
(small spades), moved about 200 yards to the left 
or to about the centre of our Company objective, 
and started to dig in. The ground was drier here 
and the soil about the color and consistency of 
cheese. They began to shell us a bit, and I never 
saw men disappear in the ground so fast. I had 
to stop them because the trench was too narrow 
to pass in and there were no bays or fire steps; 
these had to be put in. The Germans continued 
to trickle down the slope, and I sent a group out 
to look for a Lewis gun and pans of ammunition, 
and also bandoleers of ammunition from the 
dead. They returned with one Lewis gun and two 
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pans and plenty of ammunition and, with our 
rifles, we felt relatively safe. 
 As darkness descended and before the moon 
cane out, I began to worry about a counterattack 
and sent one man – Bruce Dunn of Owen Sound 
– back to the two rear pillboxes to get, if he 
could, an SOS flare so that we could call for our 
own artillery on our SOS line which was just in 
front of us. I waited quite a while but he didn’t 
come back so I went myself to the pillbox that 
Nicholas and I had taken early in the morning. 
There were quite a number of our men in it and 
I warned them of the need to keep watch in case 
of a counterattack in the night. There were no 
flares, so I told them to get some from Battalion 
Headquarters and bring them up to me. Warren 
was asleep but for some reason I couldn’t wake 
him, so I went back because the moon had come 
out from under the clouds and we could see in 
front of us if anyone attacked. I also brought up 
some more ammunition. When I went back to the 
pillbox I went in the same side of the lean-to that 
we had used in the morning and stepped right on 
the back of the German I had shot. He made a 
sound like a cough which gave me quite a start. 
The men had left him there and were using the 
entrance at the other end of the leanto. 
 Some time after, I do not remember how 
long, a Company of the Reserve Battalion – I have 
forgotten which of the CMRs it was – arrived to 
relieve us in the front line. I sent my men back. 
By this time most of them, like myself, were still 
wet and very tired. I stayed on, keeping one man 
who volunteered to stay with me – a chap by the 
name of McArthur who once had a small sawmill 
in Owen Sound and who now lives in Burlington 
and comes to our 147th Battalion Reunions. After 
staying for some time, he and I went over to the 
pillbox that had been taken over by the 52nd to 
get my revolver which I had left there, taking a 
rifle instead. They were all in the pillbox and I 
warned them of the possibility of a counterattack 
and suggested that some should stay outside. 
 McArthur and I then walked over the 
battlefield, reaching down and touching those we 
saw on the ground to make sure that no wounded 
and unconscious were among them. We then 
went back to Battalion Headquarters, to which 
I had sent the few men I had in the trench when 
we were relieved. As soon as I went in, someone 
gave me a cigarette tin of rum and tea – mostly 
rum, I think, for it wasn’t more than a minute or 
two, they said, until I fell over on the floor sound 
asleep. There I lay for two hours, they said, with 
people tramping over me. I remember wakening 
with a start and saying, “Where are my men?” 
They told me that when they reported in they had 
been sent back to the trench we had jumped off 
from in the morning. I said that I must get back 
to them.
 I couldn’t find McArthur who had come – with 
me, and the Colonel said to an Officer who hadn’t 
been in the battle but who was standing in the 
corner, “You go up with Rutherford.” I knew the 
Officer and would have preferred to go alone; 
anyway, we started out and hadn’t gone far when 
the Hun started to shell. The first one came rather 
close and the Officer started to run in the other 
One of the Bellvue pillboxes, photographed in April or May 1919. The mud and water have given way to a rough 
grass and weeds, but the ravaged trees and forlorn crosses still unmistakeably mark this as a battlefield.
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direction. I should have let him go, but I left the 
track and followed him. When another shell 
came he went in still another direction and took 
to a shell-hole. I should have left him then, but 
I pointed my rifle at him and told him to come 
on with me. He came but by this time I was lost 
myself and decided to stay where we were until 
morning, when I knew I could locate the spot to 
which we were heading by an old sniper post in 
a tree in Wolf Copse. However, there was one of 
our own machine guns firing on fixed lines not 
far from us and the Officer (who has been dead 
for many years) decided that he was going over 
there. I told him to do so if he wanted to. 
 As soon as I could see the tree I was looking 
for I got up. I saw the Officer coming back. He 
said that the machine gun crew had a wire to 
Brigade HQ, and he had sent a message that we 
were lost and were waiting for daylight. What 
he actually said, as I found out much later, was 
that I had got him lost and threatened to shoot 
him unless he went where I wanted him to go. 
As soon as the shelling started I should have 
left him to his own devices and kept to the path 
instead of following him into the morass of shell-
holes, but I felt responsible for him because the 
Colonel had sent him with me. But I would have 
managed much better by myself and avoided the 
Colonel’s wrath, which I am told was very obvious 
when he got the message that his friend had sent 
to Brigade HQ. Anyway, as soon as the Officer 
joined me I pointed out where we were heading. 
We were soon there, where we found what little 
was still left of the Battalion. 
 That evening we were relieved and came out 
to some Geman pillboxes behind the Battalion 
Headquarters. There was one big pillbox and two 
smaller ones, and the ground was full of pieces of 
wire and dead bodies from the fighting during the 
previous summer. I got the men all packed into 
the big pillbox and one of the smaller ones; and 
the second-in-command of our Company – who 
had not been in the show but joined us as we 
passed Battalion Headquarters – took the other 
small pillbox. He had a flashlight and when we 
went in we could see that there was about one to 
two inches of water on the floor and a stretcher 
in one corner which he looked at and, despite 
the fact that he had slept the night before, said, 
“I guess I am the senior.” He went over and lay 
down while I found a place where the water 
was shallowest. He was soon asleep but I was 
shivering and knew that I couldn’t sleep. I got up 
and went over to the pillbox where I had stowed 
away most of the men. I felt around until I found 
a little crack between two of the men (all of whom 
were sleeping on their sides) and, wedging my 
shoulder between two of the sleepers, gradually 
A Canadian 6-inch Howitzer at Passchendaele. The accuracy of the artillery was poor during this battle due
to the wet conditions on the battlefield which caused the guns to sink into the mud as they fired repeatedly.
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worked my way in and fell asleep. In the morning, 
probably well on to noon, not a soul had stirred. 
They told me that someone came to the opening 
and asked if anyone had seen Mr. Rutherford but 
no one had and we slept on. When we wakened 
I, being opposite the opening, had to get up first. 
 I sat outside enjoying the sun. Looking over 
at the other small pillbox, I saw one of our boys 
– Barrett by name – from Owen Sound, sitting on 
a pile of old boards taking off his boot and socks. 
Just then a shell came over and exploded, having 
first buried itself in the mud behind him. It lifted 
him up but didn’t hurt him. Having seen me, he 
started to run towards me. When he got there I 
looked down at his feet; they were swollen and 
white except where they were gashed by the wire 
he had run through, and the dark unbleeding 
proud flesh was sticking out. It was the first 
pair of trench feet I had ever seen but that day, 
as one man after another took off his boots, I 
saw many more. My own feet were not too bad 
because my boots, which were high-laced ones, 
had been hurting the back tendons above the 
heels and I had opened them up with my knife. 
This, of course, let the water in but it also let it 
out, and this I think helped. Barrett went to the 
hospital and I don’t think ever came back; his 
feet bothered him the rest of his life. 
 From here we moved back to the camp near 
St. Jean and did working parties on the plank 
road which became the main artery of supply 
and approach to the front for the two succeeding 
phases of the Passchendaele Battle six days 
apart. Having been in the battle, I missed the 
rather unpleasant assignments of these working 
parties. On about the eighth day after our attack, 
the Padre – Captain Davis – announced that he 
was going back to the battlefield to collect what 
he could from the pockets of those who had been 
killed. The Colonel was letting him go alone and I 
asked if I could go with him. He rather grudgingly 
replied that I could, but that it wouldn’t count 
as a working party and that I would have to take 
mine when my turn came. The Padre, one of the 
most fearless men I have ever known, was happy 
to have me go with him, and we set out early one 
morning with full water bottles and a fruit cake 
from home in our pockets. It was a walk of about 
six miles, largely on duckboards which are two 
scantling side by side about two feet apart and 
battens about two inches apart nailed between. 
We got there before noon. The Padre had made 
little bags from sandbags so that he could keep 
separate what we found on each man, and these 
went into two larger sandbags. 
 We worked the left sector first and as there 
was some random shelling, we went into the 
pillbox that Nicholas and I had taken the morning 
of the battle; the dead German was still near 
the end of the lean-to. We ate our fruit cake 
and had a drink from our water bottles, having 
first washed our hands with some of the water. 
When we came out the sun was shining and the 
buildings of Passchendaele were easily seen, and 
I guess we were too because it wasn’t long until 
the Hun started to shell us. Of course I ducked 
for a shellhole when I heard one coming close, 
but the Padre just looked at me and stood his 
ground until I heard one coming which, from 
the way he was bracketing us, should have been 
dead on; I threw my arms around the Padre and 
threw him down, luckily into a shell-hole, which 
saved both of us because the shell buried itself 
only feet away and showered us with earth when 
it exploded. The Padre just got up and shook 
himself as if nothing had happened. 
Soldiers from 4 CMR rest in a barn, October 1917.
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 After a while the Hun, probably guessing 
what we were doing, stopped shelling and we 
covered the rest of the field in peace. Most of our 
dead were in and around the pillbox that Tommy 
Holmes took by bombing the machine-gun crew 
which was outside and then getting another bomb 
and putting it in the opening in the back; most 
of the killing here was done from the pillbox on 
Bellevue Spur over on the 43rd Battalion front 
which commanded both fronts. 
 I was anxious to find Jaffray Eaton’s body 
as I knew, from being told, almost exactly where 
he was killed. Among the dead, many of whom I 
assume were too far forward and were caught in 
our own barrage, there were two small pieces of 
board nailed together in the shape of a cross and 
stuck in the ground in a shell-hole – the side of 
which had apparently been shoveled to cover a 
dead man – which we, of course, did not disturb. 
However, when I visited the battlefield alone 15 
months later just before we left for home, I saw 
the little cross; the skull of the man covered up 
there had been washed clean by the winter and 
summer rains. I could not find an identity disk 
but, from the round, somewhat odd-shaped teeth, 
there was no doubt that it was my friend Jaffray, 
after whom I named my eldest son. 
 On the way back, as we were passing over 
Abraham Heights where, ten days earlier, we had 
spent the night on the way into Passchendaele, the 
Hun started to bracket us again, one shell in front 
then one behind, another in front and so on. I was 
walking on the duckboards in front of the Padre; 
every time I heard one coming I would flatten 
out on the duckboards and, looking up, would 
see the Padre only pull his steel hat down on the 
side on which he thought the shell was going to 
drop. About the third time this happened I said, 
“Padre, you must think I am shell-shocked.” 
 “Oh no, Tommy,” he said, “but I don’t think you 
are a very good judge of distance and direction!” 
It is not surprising that he was killed when his 
throat was cut by a shell splinter at Amiens, and 
no wonder every man in the Battalion mourned as 
if he had lost an only brother. He was an Irishman 
from the south of Ireland; a Protestant brought up 
among Catholics which goes to make a tolerant 
man and a Christian gentleman. As he had little 
use for the Colonel – whose language and actions 
were often most insulting and ungentlemanly – 
the Padre spent much of his spare time with us 
in “D” Company, roughnecks though we were. 
 When we got home that night, word had 
come through that I was to report the next day 
at the First Army School at Hardilow Plage for a 
four-week course, while the rest of the Unit went 
out on rest to be reinforced and reorganized. 
It was a pleasant place near the Coast and on 
the historic field of the Cloth of Gold. The only 
incident of note, as far as I was concerned, was 
that one Sunday morning, having missed a bus 
in Boulogne the night before, I was up before the 
Commandant for my first and only time in the 
Army. I pleaded guilty without excuse and was 
given a most unconventional punishment, that of 
writing out in longhand ten pages of Field Service 
Regulations Part I. I got back to the Battalion 
before they went into the line again, to find 
many new faces in my Platoon which, in spite of 
considerable reorganization, was still No.15, the 
best Platoon in the Regiment, commonly known 
throughout the Unit as “The Hun Strafers.” I 
had taken it over from Gregory Clark, MC, when 
he was promoted to Captain and went to be 
Adjutant. A hard man to follow. 
* * * * *
The Battle of Passchendaele – reputed to be the most bloody of the War – was, in its 
first and second and third phases, different 
from many battles, in that it was fought under 
extremely difficult conditions both as to weather 
and ground. Despite history book figures with 
respect to our front, our losses in killed and 
wounded - and there were few survivors among 
those seriously wounded – were at least five times 
that of the Germans. Of course we made up the 
difference in the number of prisoners taken. The 
ground taken – about 50 acres for each Unit – 
meant nothing. The Paris edition cf the Daily 
Mail came out in the spring with a paragraph 
as follows: “We have again compelled the Hun 
to occupy the desolate waste of Passchendaele.”
Prior reconnaissance and maps indicating the 
locations of the pillboxes were inadequate. If the 
Germans had been smart and got out of their 
pillboxes just as soon as the barrage had passed 
instead of staying inside too long, in some cases 
until we got there, there would have been as few 
survivors everywhere as in front of Bellevue Spur. 
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From the start every Officer, NCO, and man was 
on his own. There was no way to control such a 
battle under such conditions. Our guns, stuck 
as they were in the mud, were in no position to 
fire a rolling barrage. If more mortars and smoke 
bombs had been used, our casualties would 
have been less than half what they were. Our 
men were loaded down with equipment which 
restricted their speed of movement which was 
most essential. Fifty – yes, even half that number 
– of good guerrilla-trained fighting men, properly 
led, could have won our battle and taken as many 
prisoners with very little loss. 
These are strange things to say now, but from 
what I have said here of the happenings on our 
own particular front I believe them to be only too 
true, in the light of my subsequent experience.
Postscript
Rutherford’s description of the battlefield and the effect that it had on the lead elements 
of the attacking force highlight the inability of 
the British and Canadian Staff to comprehend 
the impact that the harrowing conditions 
would have on the individual soldier and the 
achievability of designated objectives. 
The actions of the lead companies prior to 
the battle are interesting. First, the onus for 
intelligence gathering appears to have been 
at the tactical level. Rutherford participated in 
a standing patrol at “Wolf Farm” in the hours 
preceding H-Hour but continued to seek to 
define the German defensive layout right up to 
the moment of jumping off. The platoon screens 
deployed by both “C” and “D” Companies along 
their respective frontages to the barrage line 
denied German occupation of no-man’s-land 
but gleaned little intelligence. Nevertheless, it 
proved successful in countering the emerging 
German doctrine of dispersing forces in 
forward areas to break up attacks.7  The 4th 
CMR history notes that unlike previous battles, 
“the enemy’s line of defence was not a series 
of uniform trenches to be taken and mopped 
up” but rather “ isolated trenches and strong-
points dotted here and there.”8  The failure to 
define the German defensive layout produced a 
“threat centric” attack in which small groups of 
men fought toward German pillboxes ignoring 
company boundaries. This reality is illustrated 
by Rutherford’s self-portrayal of isolation 
throughout the battle. Very few references are 
provided of his own platoon until the attack 
succeeded and the 4th CMR consolidated on 
the German position. 
Another reason for the conduct of a series of 
independent low-level actions rather than a 
concentration of force may be rooted to the 
unsatisfactory artillery support which made 
coordinated fire and the maintenance of 
momentum difficult. Lieutenant-Colonel W.R. 
Patterson, the Commanding Officer of the 4th 
CMR, considered the Canadian barrage “erratic 
and not uniform.”9  In fact the barrage moved 
only half as fast as it should have due to the 
difficulty in keeping guns stable in the muddy 
landscape.10  As a result of this instability, it 
seems likely that Rutherford’s postulation that 
initial friendly casualties were suffered as a 
result of artillery rounds falling short is accurate. 
He also alludes to the fact that members of “C” 
Company, 4th CMR, who suffered the most 
casualties from friendly artillery fire may have 
been too far forward. Rutherford also suggests 
the use of increased smoke and trench mortars 
would have prevented many casualties.11 
The battlefield conditions at Passchendaele also 
appear to have impeded the re-supply of the 
fighting soldiers and made the quick evacuation 
of serious casualties difficult. Rutherford 
Brigadier Tom Rutherford photographed
during the Second World War.
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noted the absence of water prior to and 
during the battle with irony and commented, 
“water, water everywhere but not a drop to 
drink.” He also commented on the number of 
seriously wounded men who died as a result 
of their wounds. Interestingly, historian Daniel 
Dancocks suggests that the chances of surviving 
a wound were impressively good and lauds 
the stretcher-bearers for their efforts.12  This 
may have been attributable to the ability of 
slightly wounded soldiers to prevent themselves 
from drowning while seriously wounded men 
floundered in the morass. Rutherford also notes 
the effects of trench foot among his men after 
the battle. The 4th CMR War Diary highlights 
this problem and 29 men were evacuated after 
the battle for this ailment.13  
Rutherford suggests that 50 guerilla-trained 
men could have accomplished the battalion’s 
objectives. Prior to the war, Rutherford studied 
in detail the actions of the Boer farmers against 
the British in South Africa and thought this 
type of warfare had great merit.14  He credits 
the “ditching” of his cumbersome equipment 
and the use of a rifle early in the battle as 
essential to his survival and also alludes to the 
displeasure of the Colonel when he learned of 
this act.15  Also noteworthy is his observation 
that most of the casualties at Bellevue Spur 
were inflicted by rifle fire. His comment on the 
number of German casualties as being five 
times less than those suffered by the 4th CMR is 
also surprising. Although the battalion captured 
200 prisoners, they suffered 291 casualties 
and Rutherford was the only officer in the lead 
companies that was left unscathed.16 
 Rutherford continued to serve in the 4th 
CMR until 25 August 1918 when he was 
wounded by a German gas shell at Monchy-le-
Preux. Returning home in 1919, he remained 
in the Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM) 
throughout the interwar period, commanding 
the Grey Regiment on two occasions and later 
the 22nd Infantry Brigade. During the Second 
World War, he commanded the Grey and Simcoe 
Foresters and later the 1st Armoured Brigade 
and the 11th Infantry Brigade. Considered too 
old for fighting command, he was put in charge 
of the Canadian Armoured Corps Reinforcement 
Units in England until the end of the war. Upon 
his return to Canada in 1946 he worked for 
the Department of Veteran’s Affairs as Director 
General Rehabilitation under Lieutenant-
General Tommy Burns. He lost a number of 
friends at Passchendaele and returned to the 
battlefield three times before his death in 1975.
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